Presidential Address

The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: A Developmental Approach

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This paper describes as an inescapable developmental phenomenon: man's need to identify some people as allies and others as enemies. This need evolves from the individual's efforts to protect his sense of self, which is intertwined with his experiences of ethnicity, nationality, and other identifying circumstances. When threatened by political or military conflict, man clings ever more stubbornly to these circumstances in an effort to maintain and regulate his sense of self. Members of any given group revert to childhood ways of reinforcing their bonding, developing shibboleths, and investing objects with mystical value. Anyone trying to deal with interethnic or international conflict must grasp the psychological cogency of man's need to have enemies as well as allies, and his stubborn adherence to identification with a group when undergoing hardship and danger. This need is the basis of political psychology, connecting the public arena of political action with individual psychological development. Political, economic, military, and historical factors are customarily weighed in any attempt to solve turbulence, but it is necessary to consider also the profound effect of human psychology.

KEY WORDS: nationalism; ethnicity; psychoanalytic group psychology; transitional objects and phenomena; suitable targets of externalization; identification; the adolescent passage.

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INTRODUCTION

Some may regard political psychology as one of those vague hybrid sciences that is made up of selected, incomplete contributions from many more conventional authorities. The study of politics chiefly involves sociology taking into account the machinations of man in his society, and all the structural interfacing of such machinations. Aristotle called man a political animal, implying that man's nature requires the establishment of well-defined groups with functional concerns. Moreover, to be political in the way Aristotle meant is to order such groups according to a common principle viewing the city, state, or nation as the best structural embodiment of its priorities. The Greek polis of Athens constituted an entire nation for the Athenians; its refinement reflected the changing need of its subjects. It was both a receptacle for and an architectonic structure of the national character Athenians felt to be peculiarly their own. Athens depended for its national identity as much on recognition of its own character as upon the unlike character of others.

We may see the political genesis of any large group in the urge to develop, protect, maintain, or refine what it perceives to be its national or common character. While political science addresses the manifestations of that urge through its study of the intricate interrelationships of economics, history, military science, and governmental processes, it often neglects the psychological determinants of a group in isolation or in contact with other groups. We have many ways to study groups brought into contact with each other, but when that contact becomes conflict, we must recognize the nature of that conflict as an animal phenomenon. Psychoanalysis stresses the fact that conflict is normal in the dynamics of life; the life process includes conflict. Lampl-de Groot (1963) notes that

> Every creature experiences clashes with its environment which it has to encounter in order to preserve its own existence. In the highly differentiated and complicated structure of the human mind conflicts not only originate from an encounter with the environment, but, to a great extent, they take place between internal sub-areas. (p. 2)

The study of human psychology has brought us enormous insight into the processes by which the individual confronts and masters conflict, both internally and externally. Conflicts within the human psyche constitute the source of that psyche's growth whenever they can be resolved without damaging integrity.

Innate potentials and developmental factors influence the ability of an individual's ego to synthesize adaptively the diverse demands made upon his self. In the "normal" resolution of a conflict, an individual's ego allows him sufficient gratification of the demands of his inner instinctual drives and emotional needs, as well as those of his conscience and his idealized construction of himself. This process occurs without disturbing his relationship with others,
with the mental representations he entertains, or with his environment in general. Such “normal” processes are enriching, and adaptive resolution of new conflicts as they arise makes the individual better equipped psychologically. Whenever the “normal” solution of a conflict is not achieved, however, pathological outcomes, which may include symptoms, will emerge.

All humans have gone through developmental stages in which they were forced to confront conflict, and our arsenals of defense are not only species specific but phase specific as well. Each developmental stage has its own special set of defenses for the mastering of conflict, so one must conclude that intergroup or international conflict contains the basic elements of the conflict each individual experiences psychologically. Political psychology approaches the intergroup conflict from a position that presupposes the existence of elements of individual psychology within the political framework of the situation. It also recognizes that psychological forces operating within groups seem to take their own special directions once those groups are formed. Thus, by observing the correspondence between development of the individual self and that of the group or nation, political psychology provides a useful and very specific light with which to illuminate the seemingly inexplicable— and therefore unpredictable— behavior of groups in conflict.

The aim of this paper is to study from a developmental point of view the need to have enemies and allies, and to indicate that this need forms the basis of political psychology. It can be said that there would be no political psychology if individuals and groups did not have a need for enemies among other groups, and allies within their own or other groups whom they might perceive as extensions of their own support systems. If it is true that enemies are as important to human nature as allies, then we have no choice but to include depth psychology in the study of political processes and conflicts.

GEORGE ORWELL ON NATIONALISM

Since my presidential term fell in part in 1984, the year about which George Orwell made so many dire predictions, I think it appropriate to begin here by reviewing his essay on nationalism, written in 1945. By “nationalism” Orwell meant, “first of all the habit of assuming that human beings can be classified like insects and that whole blocks of millions or tens of millions of people can be confidently labeled ‘good’ or ‘bad’” (p. 362). Political psychologists would modify this only by substituting “allies” or “enemies.”

Orwell went on to explain that by nationalism he also meant “the habit of identifying oneself with a single nation or other unit, placing it beyond good and evil and recognising no other duty than that of advancing its interests” (p. 362). He saw nationalism as what psychiatrists would call a patho-
logical contamination of the mental process. Because of this, it is important to note the distinction he makes between nationalism and patriotism, toward which he is less pejorative, almost sympathetic. He defines patriotism as “devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life, which one believes to be the best in the world but has no wish to force upon other people. (It) is of its nature defensive, both militarily and culturally” (p. 362). It would appear that he saw nationalism as patriotism turned sour, defining it as “power hunger tempered by self-deception” (p. 363). He described the nationalist as one whose abiding purpose is “to secure more power and more prestige, not for himself but for the nation or other unit in which he has chosen to sink his own individuality” (p. 362).

A keen observer, he notes certain characteristics to be found in all instances of nationalism. First, there is the obsession with allegiance to the nationalist’s own unit. “The smallest slur upon his own unit, or any implied praise of a rival organization, fills him with uneasiness which he can only relieve by making some sharp retort” (p. 367). The nationalist’s obsession with loyalty does not keep him from transferring it; Freud (1921) observed, as Le Bon (1895) had, the suggestibility, impulsivity, and changeability exhibited by groups, which are readier to invest interest in a leader, cause, or purpose than individuals are to fall in love or to devote themselves to a work goal (Rochlin, 1973). The narcissism of a group quickly attaches itself to a choice—and it can also withdraw as quickly. But it is not only the group that is fickle; individuals operating within groups manifest a characteristic fickleness when dealing with group-related issues. Indeed, Orwell calls instability the second principal characteristic of nationalism. A country or some other well-defined social unit idealized for years may suddenly become detestable, transformed into an enemy, with some other country or unit becoming the object of affection, the trustworthy ally. According to Orwell, “Transferred nationalism, like the use of scapegoats, is a way of attaining salvation without altering one’s conduct” (p. 369).

Nationalism’s third principal characteristic is indifference to reality. Nationalists do not perceive resemblances between like sets of circumstance. Orwell noted of his own time that a British Tory would defend self-determination in Europe but strongly oppose it for India. John E. Mack (1979) described a phenomenon he called “the egism of victimization,” in which there is no real empathy for suffering experienced by a group’s traditional enemies, although it may be as severe as that of the group itself—or even worse. Orwell pondered the fact that “the nationalist not only does not disapprove of atrocities committed by his own side but he has a remarkable capacity for not even hearing about them” (p. 370). This indifference to objective truth gives a peculiarly subjective slant to world news; everything depends on the reporter’s alignment with one side or the other.
DEFINITIONS OF NATIONALISM AND ETHNICITY

Orwell’s comments on nationalism give us as useful a definition for it as any offered by historians or sociologists. For nationalism, like ethnicity, is a term that changes its scope and substance according to the discipline in which it is being studied. Historians explain nationalism and ethnicity by examining historical factors, while sociologists emphasize the sociological components of the two concepts [see, for example, Shafer (1976), and Berlin (1979)]. In either case, psychological explanations for ethnicity and nationalism are usually overlooked. Peterson (1980), for instance, described a “nation” as “a people linked by common descent from a putative ancestor and by its common territory, history, language, religion, and/or way of life” (p. 235). Shafer’s (1976) observations are more dynamic: He suggests that the nationalism of any one individual in each nation differs from that of others in nature and intensity, and that it varies with time, place, and circumstance. He adds the concept of what he calls the “subnation,” which is a unit smaller than a nation but otherwise like it. Although this term has not been widely adopted, it may be usefully applied to an understanding of ethnicity, which has limits like those of the “subnation” that are hard to fix, being “seldom directly associated with the counterpart of a boundary-protecting state” (Peterson, 1980, p. 253).

People sharing ethnicity and considered an “ethnic group” are, according to Peterson, at least latently aware of common interests. It is observable that an ethnic group has a sense of its own distinct identity and conveys this sense to the following generation. The same is true of racial groups. Even at this superficial level, however, ethnicity may be seen to present a paradox of psychological adaptation. Stein (1984) points out that the sense of ethnicity (and, by extension, of nationality), enhances survival and the cohesion of the group, but on the other hand endangers the group’s future by causing it to split off from others and to allocate its own group-dystonic attributes to those from whom it has separated.

The more complex psychological implications of nationality and ethnicity will become evident as their psychological definitions evolve here, but it is important for now to note that raw emotions, whether open or hidden, are involved in the experience of one’s nationality and ethnicity. That experience, with all its attendant feelings, does function to provide psychological borders for the individual.

One wonders if Orwell anticipated this dual nature of the phenomenon of nationalism—the possibility that it might have an adaptive or constructive side as well as a maladaptive or destructive one. In view of his separating nationalism from patriotism, it seems likely that he considered this possibility. His essay addresses a fundamental question about man’s nature:
how is it that he can—indeed, must—adhere stubbornly to an alliance with a given unit while simultaneously making another unit his enemy? And concerning this capacity we may ask when it supports self-esteem and identity in a normal way and when it leads to complicated pathological processes in individuals and in groups. Is the need to have enemies as well as allies a part of human nature? Is it inescapable?

ERIKSON AND PINDERHUGHES ON ENEMIES AND ALLIES

Murray Edelman (1983) presented a paper entitled “The Need for Enemies” at the sixth annual meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology at Oxford, of which Section I was Chairman. Since he is a political scientist, his interests lie in the power structures that direct the formation of states or groups, but he stressed the need for psychological insight into the nature of power. He holds that categorization is one way in which power may be maintained and perpetuated. The power seat that seeks to perpetuate itself accomplishes this partly by creating definite categories of “enemy” and “ally,” attributing to the latter all the qualities the culture considers good: honesty, integrity, cleanliness, and loyalty. The “enemy” category becomes the receptacle for the antitheses of these same virtues. Edelman points out that the assignment of attributes is often arbitrary and bears no resemblance to any demonstrable reality, but the mechanism behind categorization is one that draws clear battle lines; the individual's devotion to the protection of the seat in power thus arises from an appeal to his own culturally instilled beliefs.

Edelman's theories do not concern the particular features of depth psychology per se, but his reliance on observations of psychological behavior within political constructs further suggests the link between political science and psychology. And where political science makes clear the link between the political need for enemies, psychoanalysis hopes to find the genesis of the need for enemies and allies in the developmental years of childhood. Erik Erikson and Charles Pinderhughes, both psychoanalysts, have turned to biology for an explanation of why cultural groups create the concept of an enemy. In biology, the term pseudophenomenon is applied to a manifestation that seems unique but is actually a modification of something previously encountered. Erikson (1966) uses the term pseudospecies in reference to the diversity of mankind, saying, “Man has evolved (by whatever kind of evolution or whatever adaptive reasons) in pseudospecies, i.e., tribes, clans, classes, etc., which behave as if they were separate species, created at the beginning of time by supernatural intent” (p. 606). He speculates about the ways aggressive and sexual instinctual drives contributed to the establishment of human beings in well-defined groups.
Primitive man sought a measure of protection for his vulnerable nakedness by adopting the armor of the lower animals, wearing their skins, feathers, and claws. Each group feared the human who belonged to another subspecies of mankind. Erikson notes that not only did each group develop "a distinct sense of identity, but also a conviction of harboring the human identity" (p. 606). This attitude fortified each pseudospecies by engendering the belief that the others were "extraspecific and inimical to 'genuine' human endeavor" (p. 606). But he notes that every newborn human is a "generalist" who could fit into any number of pseudospecies, becoming "specialized" only after going through childhood in a given culture.

After observing the group-related paranoid process among representatives of 34 countries, and discussing the conditions of that process with them, Pinderhughes (1982) concluded that discrimination and the paranoid process are apparently universal. We can go further and say that each small group needs to see another as the enemy. Those urban American ethnic antagonisms that run, not along economic or social lines, but along racial and cultural ones, would seem to bear this out. In turn, however, the larger group (the nation) may unite to oppose another nation seen as a common enemy. Turning to biology for an explanation of aspects of this group-related process, Pinderhughes cites the work of Lorenz (1963), who noted how animals often simultaneously display alienation from one object and attraction to another. Animal bonding is strengthened by exhibitions of this approved behavior; a mate who bares his teeth at an intruder strengthens his bond to his mate.

Pinderhughes notes that Lorenz's findings focused on only one side of a two-faceted phenomenon:

Lorenz conceptualized bonding in affiliative terms but not in terms of aggression. Biological research related to bonding has focused on the imprinting process, on attachments to territory and to mates and, generally, has not dealt with aggressive behavior as bonding phenomena. (p. 8)

Nonetheless, Pinderhughes suggests that, although humans are affiliatively and affectionately bonded to certain ideas and persons, they are also aggressively and divisively bonded to others:

In fact, human psychophysiological processes of affiliation, introjection, identification and affection appear to be psycho-physiological elaborations, built on the bedrock of physiology. Differentiation, projection, repudiation and aggression appear to be built on the bedrock of avoidance physiology. (p.8)

Pinderhughes developed in a series of papers (1970, 1974, 1979, 1982) what he called the "differential paired bonding theory." He postulates a universal drive to dichotomize arising from biological, physiological, social, and psychological causes. He links the mechanism of dichotomization to a bifold bonding process occurring in infant development. In "A-bonding," the infant is connected with the mental representation of one object by means of affiliative-affectionate physiology; in "D-bonding," the mental
representations of another object are connected with the infant through
differentiative-aggressive physiology. He observes that this bifocal bonding
has social ramifications, those groups whose members share objects of “A-
bonding” being also “D-bonded” to “common renounced targets” (p. 9).

The notion of paired differential bonding is not inconsistent with well-
supported psychoanalytic concepts, but psychoanalysis addresses it with a
complex approach recognizing the many interrelated influences on infant men-
tation. A better understanding of what Pinderhughes calls “common
renounced targets” and what I call “suitable targets for externalization”
(Volkan, 1985) may be obtained through a consideration of relevant psy-
choanalytic concepts. I will begin with a review of psychoanalytic theories
of groups.

PSYCHOANALYTIC GROUP PSYCHOLOGY

Group psychology is concerned with persons as members of a race, na-
tion, caste, profession, or institution; or as a component part of a crowd
of persons who have come together for a specific purpose during a circum-
scribed period of time. In Group Psychology and Analysis of the Ego, Freud's
(1921) major work on the subject, he distinguished between individual
psychology—that is, the concerns of the individual that relate to the gratifi-
cation of and defenses against his instinctive impulses—and group psychol-
ogy. By using knowledge about the genesis of the individual, he tried to
understand the dynamics of the group. His findings seemed to indicate that
the group is less than the sum of its parts.

He began by examining Le Bon’s (1895) theories about collective men-
tal life. Le Bon held that an individual in a group loses much of his distinct-
tiveness, and acts instead in accordance with the homogeneous urges that
unite the group. The effects of this concept are readily apparent. When we
observe any group—even a purely functional one, whether a marching band
or a senate in session—what we see is a unified body whose goals or needs
determine its behavior. Individuality is displaced by common identity, and
individual achievements or acquisitions are notable only insofar as their rela-
tive success or failure furthers or hinders the functioning of the group.

Freud developed Le Bon’s ideas with an emphasis on the psychological
mechanism that makes this phenomenon possible. He believed that the ef-
facement of dissimilarity among individuals that occurs under the domina-
tion of collective unity may be traced to the liberation of formerly repressed
racial urges common to the group. When individuality is obliterated, these
unconscious fundamental instincts surface in the individual, and, since they
are shared by all members of the group, being, indeed, the fundamental points
of contact among them, that group's identity is streamlined and shaped by the dictates of those urges.

Freud was led to contemplate the changes in the individual that occur as a result of the dynamics of group identity. Le Bon had observed that an individual functioning within a group may derive from his identity with it characteristics not hitherto his. This suggests that collective intellectual functioning supersedes over individual intellectual functioning. Le Bon expected that the erosion of the rational faculties of the individual might lead to more powerful and/or irrational emotions. Other observers later attributed such increased affectivity to the force of feelings of omnipotence and danger consequent upon the more generalized surge of the group's collective intellectual activity. Freud, however, concentrating on the increased suggestibility among group members, associated it with libido. Since irrational surrender of the individual's intellect implies equally willing suggestibility to collective emotional impulses, he reasoned that this tradeoff would come about only through the power of the libido. If, as he held, the group mind was structured on or derived from relationships based on familial patterns, then that same libidinal foundation might account for the individual's ready effacement of uniqueness within the group. Suggestibility, in which one permits others to exert inordinate influence over him, follows this effacement as a manifestation of the libidinal urge to feel harmonious with the group rather than apart from it.

Freud saw the Church and the Army as examples. Both are artificial groups structured around the authority of a single benevolent leader, and in which members are seen as equal, with equality being defined libidinally. To be equal is to be loved equally by Christ or the commander-in-chief, respectively. Also, to be equal is to love other members of the group as one. Hence the mutual ties ordering the group rest on a balance of very basic emotions. Freud saw these mutual ties stemming from what he called identification; the individual sees his group as an important object of love as well as a manifestation of common emotion. Moreover, the individual perceives the group as seeking satisfaction of the same vital needs he himself wants to satisfy, and this congruity makes him idealize the group, identify with, and love it. He suspends his critical faculties, falsely inflating the group's value. Humility and subjection replace insight, so the many who operate with the same object of love are tied libidinally to it and to one another. This creates a primary group.

Freud further defined the characteristics of the primary group by reworking earlier theories about man's innate herd instinct. The character of man's drive to identify with a group had been noted; Freud qualified this by his observation that although group members want to enjoy equality, they want one man to lead them. In other words, man is a horde animal desiring membership in a strong group led by a strong leader.
In discussing the nature of groups, Freud limited himself to one type—the "regressively-formed" (Waelder, 1971); and he limited himself to consideration of one type of group impact—that of the leader upon his followers (Stanton, 1958). A group's regressive attributes are those necessary for the horde's integrity—the disappearance of individual personality, a common emotional focus, suspension of the critical faculty, and immediacy of response; these represent a retreat to a more primitive developmental state of organization. Regression is a response to anxiety, which is a crucial concept in psychoanalysis. Anxiety reflects the presence of internal conflict, and signals the ego to initiate defenses to ward off any consciousness of unacceptable derivatives of instinctual drives. Regression is one of these defenses, providing archaic patterns of response for a situation that presents new and insuperable difficulties. In clinical practice we commonly see regression in the process of resolving an Oedipus complex; those aspects of this complex perceived as dangerous to the neurotic patient's ego, i.e., unconscious sexual and aggressive impulses and castration anxiety, lead to conflicts in which regression is used as a defense.

If, as Freud implies, group coherence is a regressive response to danger or threat, we might expect to find derivatives of oedipal influence in group formations and functions. Locating this influence was a central concern of early psychoanalytic writers, who first determined that the Oedipus complex represents a paradigm for much of the structure upon which society depends. In the oedipal phase of human development, approximately between 3 and 5 years of age, the child is faced with the task of starting to establish his own sexual identity. To that end he desires union with the parent of the opposite sex, who is viewed as an object of love and erotic desire, and longs for the death or disappearance of the same-sex parent, who is seen as a rival for the loved object.

This phase, with its conflicting libidinal and aggressive urges, activates the development of several interrelated features of the evolving psyche. In the first place, the child's wish for the death of the parent he considers a rival evokes a fear of reprisal from that parent. The reprisal fantasy is specific to the nature of the aggressive urge; in male children, especially, it takes the form of a fear of castration. At the same time, the oedipal phase brings the beginnings of the completion of the superego, which is that aspect of the psychic apparatus we normally regard as conscience. To it is assigned responsibility for moral and ethical attitudes, and it influences the appearance of guilt feelings. The standards of one's superego are usually derived from the society in which he lives, and from identification with the attitudes of one's parents.

Since the superego deals with the affirmation of values and ideals and also punishes the transgression of those ideals by guilt or pangs of conscience,
it is clear that the completion of superego is intricately tied to the nexus of conflict instigated by the Oedipus complex. Traditionally, Oedipus yielded to the basic desires identified in this phase by marrying his mother and murdering his father. Since such conduct is condemned by society as involving incest and patricide, the psyche, to stay healthy, must mediate the instinctual drives of this phase and the affirmative relationship with society and parents that the individual is in the process of establishing. One healthy method of resolution is for the child to identify with the father-aggressor; such identification is fueled in the boy by fear of castration. If the powerful father cannot be beaten as a rival, he can be identified with as a fellow aggressor; thus, sexual identity is established through recognition of common desire, as it were. This identification has further formative implications: It affirms the values of society, assuages the guilt attendant on aggression, and tempers the source of castration anxiety.

Oedipal influences are sought in social institutions because of the obvious parental structures they embody; the leader of a group, be he a president, a pope, or a general, clearly represents a father figure. The inherent oedipal rivalry between father and son, or between the authority figure heading a group and its members, must be resolved if the group is to remain intact. Thus any hostility between a member and the leader must be transformed by the member into the kind of loyalty and devotion that comes from a successfully resolved Oedipus complex. Just as the son identified with the aggressor father, so the member identifies with the leader. To say simply that group psychology can be explained by the Oedipus complex, however, ignores the evolving psychological structure of the individual in both his pre-oedipal and later stages. What is more important, it suggests only a tenuous link between earlier individual evolution and the beginning of group psychology. If the strong links that do exist are to be made evident, questions must be asked about the relationship between the pre-oedipal life of the individual and the foundations of large-group “bonding,” which goes beyond identification with the family.

Stanton (1958) refers to a discussion by Fritz Redl, who spoke of “the glaring need for reconceptualization of the psychoanalytic theory of group behavior” (p. 123). I do not believe that we must throw out the baby with the bath water; we should expand the theories of the psychoanalytic understanding of groups instead of limiting ourselves to circumscribed notions of regressively formed groups that function only according to their leaders’ expectations.

Bion (1961) studied groups having from eight to 12 members whose leaders refused to give directions or to make any decisions, but merely observed their groups. Under these conditions, the regressive processes of each group became evident in accordance with three basic emotional assumptions.
that Bion described as the "dependency," "pairing," and "fight-flight" assumptions. The group operating from the first perceives its leader as omnipotent and itself as incompetent. It desperately tries to persuade or coerce its leader into responding to its dependency needs, and when the leader "fails" to respond to these needs, the group devalues him and looks for a substitute leader who will be more effective. The members of the "dependency assumption" group are united by a shared sense of need and helplessness. This is their focus, and it is with frustration that they rather dimly view the outside world as a void.

The group Bion categorizes as holding a "pairing assumption" focuses on a couple perceived as leaders. Although this couple need not necessarily be heterosexual, the group fantasizes that their sexual union will reproduce the group, thus ensuring its longevity and survival.

The group with the "fight-flight assumption" perceives its leader as directing a fight against the group's external enemies, but it soon breaks down into subgroups that fight with each other. Groups of this category operate from a center of suspicion and aggressive control, fearing destruction by forces from beyond their borders.

Bion's observations are interesting because they study the behavior of groups apart from the precepts of the group-leader interactions that Freud cited. Bion believed that all three emotional assumptions exist potentially in all groups, and that various factors, all of which ultimately bring about the breakdown of the group's task structure, can trigger the emergence of any one of the three. In other words, Bion's work suggests that there are universal dynamics inherent in all groups, and, moreover, that they are not directly dependent on the leader's impact on the group. The group can instead be seen as an active party shaping its own perceptions of its leader; under certain circumstances, the followers may perceive their leader according to their basic emotional assumptions. Thus it can be said that groups can have an impact upon leaders.

Kernberg (1980) later confirmed Bion's findings when he reapplied his own observations to larger groups. Volkan (1980, 1981a) and Volkan and Itzkowitz (1984) further described the active role of the group by pointing out a "fit" between the needs of the followers and the character of their leader, especially with his conscious and unconscious ambitions. But the focus in all of these studies has remained solely on the interaction between leaders and followers, and the impact of those dynamics on regression within the group.

The problem of being restricted in our understanding of group dynamics by a focus that seems too narrow, at least from the viewpoint of psychoanalytic theory, is also evident in an examination of lay treatment of the psychological aspects of world affairs. Political scientists, for instance, have
tended to constrict the possibilities for psychological insight by usurping psychoanalytic concepts in order to press them into their own specific service. The concept of the superego is widely used by political scientists because it provides them with a ready metaphor for the type of behavior they observe among international superpowers. It is no more than metaphor to see the United States as a superego when it sends its Sixth Fleet into the Mediterranean to prevent conflict; the metaphorical superego is a far cry from that portion of the individual psychic apparatus that absorbs and adopts the value systems of parents and important others through internalization and identification. This is the kind of superego to which we must accurately ascribe group behavior. In order to get beyond the metaphor of popular usage, and to take our study of group psychology beyond the limits of leader-follower interaction, I will focus here on what is known as the sense of self.

THE PROTECTION AND REGULATION OF THE SENSE OF SELF BY TRANSITIONAL OBJECTS AND TARGETS OF EXTERNALIZATION

The sense of self, put simply, is the impression one carries of how his emotional, intellectual, and physical components combine in response to the world around him. A number of psychoanalytic writers (Kohut, 1977; Mack, 1983; Volkan, 1985) have explored how an individual’s sense of self is intertwined with his sense of ethnicity and nationality. We observe how our sense of self rises and falls according to the rise and fall of our nation’s fortunes. Moreover, an individual or group adheres more stubbornly to a sense of ethnicity or nationality when stressed by political or military crises (Volkan, 1979). According to Mack (1983),

There are but a few commitments for which man will kill others or will voluntarily surrender their own lives. The defense of the nation, if it is felt to be threatened, is one of them. Indeed, nationalistic leaders have not infrequently shown a willingness to sacrifice whole peoples in the service of national interest as they define it. There is no dispute about the power that nationalism holds over men's minds in this century. But the psychological roots of this power are little studied and poorly understood. (p. 47)

I believe that what I call suitable targets of externalization have much to do with how the individual begins to be part of a group, above and beyond the influence of his internalized parental and social values. Such “targets” play a part in the genesis of ethnicity, nationality, and other similar phenomena, and are the foundations for building up concepts of enemies and allies. I will explain what I mean by this term.

Contemporary psychoanalysts (Mahler, 1968; Jacobson, 1964; Kernberg, 1966, 1976; Volkan, 1976) have been interested in how we develop in early life our images of ourselves and others. From the study of infants
and greatly regressed adults we surmise that the infant feels himself fused with the larger reality like a drop of water in the sea. One of the early tasks of the infant’s ego is to start differentiating himself from other people, to develop a psychological integument of his own. We know that the infant develops mental images of himself and others in a bipolar way; the second task he must perform is to try to integrate the opposing images and to get rid of the bipolarity of his images of himself and others.

The bipolarity arises from the early ego’s ability to distinguish pleasure from displeasure, and from the concomitant inability to integrate contrary experiences with the feeling states that accompany them. Many pleasurable as well as unpleasurable stimuli impinge on the infant, leaving an ever-increasing number of memory traces from which the individual makes memory islands (Mahler, 1968) based on the recollection of pleasure or pain. When he has had greater experience with need-satisfying as well as need-denying people and situations, these memory islands develop into good or bad images, the former becoming saturated with loving drives, the latter with aggression.

Consider a baby who is hungry and who has a dawning awareness of his bad, unpleasant sense of his needy self. Then consider the same infant, comfortable after feeding, now with a good mental image of himself. He cannot integrate the two images; the unpleasant I continues dissociated from the pleasant I. Likewise, the baby cannot put together the image of his mothering person satisfying him with the image of her when she deprives him. To him, she is two separate persons, one good and one bad. The child begins to integrate the images of himself and of the other at around 8 months of age, but this process is not completed before he is 36 months old, when he can understand that sometimes “I” feels good and sometimes bad, but is always the same person. The same process is accomplished in respect to the mothering person and others, and it becomes possible for the child to tolerate ambivalence—to love and hate the same person from time to time. The fact that “the other” sometimes pleases and sometimes angers no longer indicates the presence of “two people.”

This fusion is never complete, however. In normal development, we can fuse black images of ourselves and important others with the corresponding white ones, and get gray; but in some areas there remain only total black or total white. Psychoanalysts are curious as to what the child does with the images that stay absolute and primitive and are saturated with primitive feeling states of love or hate. I hold that the child puts some of them into “reservoirs” in the real world, (Volkan, 1979) thus investing factual circumstances with a magic that represents aspects of the child saturated with his own primitive feeling states. Such reservoirs are what I call suitable targets of externalization. As the child grows, he faces such questions as: How many parts
do I have? Am I separate from others? Who am I? What am I told that I am? Am I who I want to be or someone I do not want to be? etc. These are questions, by now arising from experiences, that refer to the individual's psychological boundaries. Our clinical observations indicate that we try to hold onto our sense of self—our perception of the self based on our senses and experiences in mind and body—throughout life, defending against anything that threatens our identity. We attempt continually, both consciously and unconsciously, to protect and regulate our sense of self.

The ways in which we do this can perhaps be put on a spectrum, examination of which will enable us to study the role of the suitable targets of externalization from a better perspective. On one side of this spectrum are psychobiological methods, and on the other, creative, flexible, adaptive, and sublimated ego mechanisms.

At the start of life, and during the first few weeks of life, the child's self may be considered a psychophysiological entity (Jacobson, 1964), which he regulates with psychophysiological mechanisms, one of which is the ability to filter external stimuli through what is known as the stimulus barrier. For example, he may sleep through loud noises or excessive motion. Recent infancy research indicates that infants have a more active control of the stimulus barrier from the beginning of life, and that they are not essentially passive organisms. They actively seek human stimulation, and titrate, so to speak, the intensity of incoming stimulation (Stern, 1983).

The child's psychophysiological self is also protected and regulated by the mothering person in her close regulatory interaction. He uses his innate abilities, autonomous ego functions (Hartmann, 1939), his mouth and hands (Hoffer, 1949) as tools to discover the outside world and to achieve what Mahler calls a "psychological birth" with differentiated images of the self. Throughout this process...

...the mothering partner is called upon to contribute a particularly large portion of symbiotic help toward the maintenance of the infant's homeostasis. Otherwise, the neurological patterning processes are thrown out of kilter. (Mahler, 1968, p. 13)

Also, during this process we see the infant's first, more purely psychological way of protecting and regulating his developing sense of self. He becomes actively involved with a "transitional object" (Winnicott, 1953), which may take the form of a teddy bear, a "security blanket," or some other object of infant solace chosen on the basis of texture, odor, etc., from among the many items available in the environment. The child treats his chosen object as more important to him than his mother; he cannot go to sleep without it. Some children, instead of clinging to a soft object, become "addicted" to some tune (transitional phenomena); or the mother may herself function as a transitional object. Winnicott (1953), who first explored the meaning...
of the transitional object and phenomena, suggested that they are identified by the child between the ages of four and twelve, purposely leaving latitude for wide variations in age. Boys and girls seem to be alike in their use of transitional objects or phenomena. Winnicott wrote:

I hope it will be understood that I am not referring exactly to the little child’s Teddy Bear nor to the infant’s first use of the fist (thumb, fingers). I am not specifically studying the first object of object-relationships. I am concerned with the first possession, and with the intermediate area between the subjective and that which is objectively perceived. (p. 90)

His emphasis was that, in response to the ministrations of a “good enough” mother, the main function of the transitional object (or phenomenon) was to achieve an illusion of there being an external reality corresponding to the child’s capacity to create.

The psychoanalytic literature includes much about the transitional object and phenomenon, and Greenacre (1969), in reviewing it, stated that the transitional object is a “construction to aid the infant in the early stages of developing a sense of reality and establishing his own individual identity” (p. 334). Thus she saw the transitional object as a cushion against frustration at a time when reality testing is still insecure. It is especially useful in helping the child to fall asleep since it bridges the experience of cuddling close to the mother’s body and having to get along apart from her. There is an implication here that its use protects and regulates the primitive sense of self. I (Volkan, 1976) have characterized this manipulative maneuver by using the metaphor of a lantern having one opaque and one transparent side; wishing to continue his commerce with the external world, the child uses his transitional object as the lantern’s transparent side, which admits the full light of the surrounding reality from which he begins to differentiate himself. When that full light is fraught with more psychophysiological tension or conflict than the child is developmentally capable of warding off or solving, he turns the opaque aspect of the lantern toward the external world, and recreates the pleasant fusion of mother-me that protects his threatened sense of self.

As the child develops, under normal conditions the magical qualities of the transitional object diminish and finally disappear. The teddy bear ceases to function as a transitional object, but its memory lingers into adulthood. As he matures, the individual begins another game of magic played with inanimate objects; when he is about three, while he is engaged in bringing together his opposing images of himself and the world, he imposes some of his unintegrated aspects of himself and perceived others onto “suitable targets.” In selecting these he is influenced by the views of those around him, attributing “badness” of his own to those his mother calls “those people (or things)”, for example.

When a child is crestfallen at taking a tumble, he says that it is his doll that has fallen down. Thus he puts his shameful self into something else,
by means of what we call externalization (Novick and Kelly, 1970). (Projection, a process more widely known, is more sophisticated. In it, formed and unacceptable thoughts and impulses are put onto someone else.) In our example of externalization, the doll had no responsibility for the child's fall but was simply a handy scapegoat, becoming a temporary reservoir for the child's image of himself as fallen down. But it is the mothering person who determines how long the doll will be a reservoir for her child's unintegrated unpleasant (dystonic) or pleasant (syntonic) fragments of self, since she herself, consciously or unconsciously, calls one thing "bad" and another "good." The familiar food, smells, and sounds of home are suitable targets on which the child can externalize aspects of himself "for safekeeping"; they are likely to be approved by all the mothering persons around. Thus they are what the children in that group will cling to, to some degree, throughout life in the construction and reaffirmation of ethnic, cultural, national, or religious identity. And although they are actually part of the environment rather than part of the child, the child will invest something of himself in them accompanied by raw feelings of love and hate directed by early concepts of "mother-me." They are extensions of the self and the important other, and those invested with pleasant, loving feelings will support the cohesion of the sense of self, while those invested with aggression will threaten it. Paradoxically, however, they will enhance the self's cohesion when used for comparison with good units kept inside or at a safe distance.

Let me explain by applying this formulation to the situation in Cyprus, my birthplace, where Greeks and Turks have lived side by side for centuries. In Cyprus, a Greek child learns from what his mother says and does that the neighborhood church is a good place; he unconsciously invests in it for safekeeping his unintegrated good aspects, and feels comfortable being in or near this building. The same mechanism makes him shun the Turkish mosque and minaret, into which he deposits the unintegrated bad aspects of himself and important others. He is more himself when playing near his church and distancing himself from the mosque.

The transitional object's role in protecting and regulating the (primitive) self relates uniquely to the child who has selected it, and who does not share it with other children. Each infant has his own version of the teddy bear, based on his own choice and not amenable to suggestions from his elders. Whatever it may be, it is, indeed, perceived as entirely sui generis and, should it be lost, even an exact replica is likely to be rejected. Suitable targets for externalization, on the other hand, products of a different life phase, are shared by the children of a given group. The psychological meanings attached to them make them serve as a foundation of intergroup relationships. Psychologically speaking, the "reservoirs" or group-specific externalizations tie children together; at this point in their development (the pre-oedipal), it is these "suitable targets" that bridge the distance between individual and group psychology.
As he becomes actively involved with suitable targets for externalization, the child who had until now been a “generalist,” to use Erikson’s (1966) term, becomes a member of a pseudospecies, although this membership does not actually crystallize until he goes through the adolescence passage. Even before reaching adolescence, however, the child begins to be able to abstract suitable targets of externalization, and to internalize the affective experience they produce. For example, interaction with his caretakers leads him to feel something like their emotion at the sight of their national flag. Although throughout life the individual may have as suitable targets of externalization only such inanimate and concrete objects as a national flag, a mascot, familiar architecture, etc., he gradually comes to feel a surge of emotion for such abstractions as nationality or ethnicity, although when stressed he may revert to the use of inanimate or non-human objects in connection with this magic, returning to his childhood method of protecting his sense of self. Thus when we see that Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip wear talismans with ethnic symbols, we attribute this to regression under stress. Like songs often repeated among the Arabs, they are shared only within the in-group, providing a magical (psychological) network for maintaining group narcissism under adverse conditions as well as contributing to the self-esteem of individual Arabs. It is not enough for Palestinians in the Gaza Strip simply to be aware of their Arabic identity; they need to exhibit its symbols in order to maintain their self-esteem.

I believe that what social scientists and anthropologists (Shils, 1957; Geertz, 1973) call primordial alliances refer to the sharing of the same suitable targets of externalization, which are in most cases products of centuries of gradual crystallization. We can study why a given object is a suitable reservoir for the reception of a group’s unmended self- and object aspects by examining related historical realities, the influence of the group’s leaders, and the role of natural disasters and economic problems and the like. It should be remembered that these influences can also invalidate the potency of a formerly magical symbol. For example, it does nothing for the sense of self of the modern Turk to don the traditional Turkish fez, once a sign of Turkish manhood, since Atatürk outlawed it in his efforts to westernize his country.

THE PROTECTION AND REGULATION OF THE SENSE OF SELF THROUGH IDENTIFICATION AND OTHER SOPHISTICATED MECHANISMS

I refer now to the far side of the spectrum, opposite that of the psychophysiological mechanisms. There we find sophisticated ways of protecting and regulating the sense of self. The more self- and object images are
mended, and the more unmended areas are repressed or externalized in ways I have discussed, the more cohesive becomes the core of the individual's self-representation. The core self-representation is rather unchangeable, with enduring constancy. Peripheral representations are somewhat more flexible in nature and constancy, but nevertheless support the core. Differentiation of the early self-images from object images and the synthesis of total self- or object images encompassing both good and bad self-representations with their affect dispositions depend on several factors: given biological factors (about which psychoanalysts have little to say), the intensity of instinctual drives and the pre-oedipal, oedipal, and post-oedipal identifications that are influenced by experience and the environment. It is through identification, an unconscious mechanism of the ego, that one assimilates the images of the other into one's own self, becoming like the other in many ways. Although identification, with disruptive images of others, may lead to problems, through adaptive identifications one is enriched and enabled to increase his repertoire of psychic functions, including those useful in the protection and regulation of the sense of self. Moreover, new investments in ethnicity, nationality, etc., become possible through identification.

The nature of the sense of self depends on the affective nature of the self-representation. The more solidified its core is, the more identifications with loving objects (people) it includes, the more positive it will be. It is not considered normal for the core self-representation to change from day to day or from crisis to crisis. What does change is the periphery, which includes identifications that are flexible, that can be influenced by circumstances and new identification, or that can revert into images to be externalized and reinternalized. Internalized and abstracted suitable targets for externalization can be located in both the core and the peripheral self-representations. The self-representation can be conceptualized as surrounded by object representations that have been internalized but not identified with. Internalized representations for suitable targets of externalization can also be located in this area. The good ones provide a buffer system for the sense of self; some remain stable in changing experience, and some are involved in introjective/projective relatedness in an attempt to regulate the sense of self. The development of the core self-representations enriches the ego and its functions.

As the ego matures and its functions enlarge, the individual can command a wide repertoire in regulation and protection of the sense of self. Such a repertoire includes "normal" and pathological means, symptom formation being among the latter. One cannot list all the usual ways one's ego performs this task in daily life, but among mechanisms commonly used are repression, sublimation, regression sublimation, regression in the service of the ego (since such regression leads to new organization), denial in the service of protecting a psychological perception that one's mental images really fit charac-
ters in the real world, etc. Suitable targets for externalization answer the "normal" need for enemies and allies in the external world, or at least have the potential of meeting this need. In daily functioning, the ego "normally" controls the psychological distance between them and the self in order to protect and regulate the sense of self.

**THE INFLUENCE OF THE ADOLESCENT PASSAGE**

Suitable targets of externalization undergo drastic modification, abstraction, and crystallization as the individual enters adolescence. My formulation follows the ideas of Blos (1979), who holds that a child has only character traits before character crystallization takes place in adolescence, the formation and crystallization of character being the end result of the ego's integrative work and the search to eliminate conflict and anxiety arousal.

Blos lists four preconditions without which adolescent character formation cannot take its proper course. He calls the first "the second individuation" in reference to Anna Freud's (1958) finding that the adolescent loosens his tie to his infantile object representations (and corresponding self-representations). She discussed the regression of ego and superego in adolescence, which precedes the new integration that crystallizes the formation of character. This regression is obligatory, phase-specific, as Blos puts it, in the service of development. The loosening of ties from internalized infantile objects, images, and representations opens the way for the adolescent to find external and extrafamilial love- and hate-objects. According to Blos:

> Adolescent regression in the service of development brings the more advanced ego of adolescence into contact with infantile drive positions, with old conflictual constellations and their solutions, with early object relations and narcissistic formations. We might say that the personality functioning which was adequate for the protoadolescent child undergoes a selective overhaul. (1979, p. 180)

This situation brings about shifts in the balance between ego and id. "New identifications ('the friends,' 'the group,' etc.) take over superego functions, episodically or lastingly" (Blos, 1979, p. 181).

Blos's second precondition refers to conquest of "residual trauma"—residuals of conditions that were "unfavorable, noxious, or drastically injurious to the development of the young individual" (Greenacre, 1967, p. 277). These are assimilated in the character formation and no longer give rise to repetitious signal anxiety.

The third precondition includes the corrective measures taken at adolescence to restore the integrity of the senses, to correct "the family myth," and to accomplish the continuity of the ego.

The fourth precondition that completes the set relates to the emergence of sexual identity. Blos agrees with many others that gender identity is es-
established at an early age, whereas "sexual identity with definite, i.e., irreversible boundaries appears only belatedly as the collateral of sexual maturation at puberty" (Blos, 1979, p. 186). Once all these preconditions are met

Character structure renders the psychic organism less vulnerable than it has ever been before, and the maintenance of this structure is secured against any interference from any quarter, internal or external. If must be, one dies for it before letting it die. (Blos, p. 190)

These formulations deal with what happens within the character or ego identity. I turn now to what happens to the "suitable targets of externalization" that are outside, though still laden with elements coming from within (above and beyond the individual's conscious awareness). As has already been stated, it is my hypothesis that although the prepubertal child is no longer a "generalist," his investment in the suitable targets remains flexible until he goes through adolescence. After that, if need be, he will die for his "good" suitable targets before letting them go. It seems that during the second individuation there is also a review of the suitable targets; the individual overhauls them, strengthening his investment in some while dropping his investment in others. As noted, although the representations of some of these targets are internalized and abstracted, others continue to exist in the external world. This modification takes place mostly outside of conscious awareness. In normal adolescence a prototype of adult mourning occurs as ties to internalized self- and object representations are loosened (Wolfenstein, 1966; Volkan, 1981b), and when this is accomplished new representations of self and object are sought to replace what has been lost. These may be at first idealized in response to the threat of losing representations that had hitherto been satisfactory—in other words, some "bad" ones must be further externalized and psychologically distanced in order to protect the newly formed idealized ones.

As the child becomes postadolescent, he will tame his newly created self- and object representations by the process of integration. Just as the "normal" mending of opposing good and bad self- and object representations is not complete, so the following mourning process that accompanies adolescent overhauling, with its rejection of unsatisfactory infantile representations, falls short of completion. Thus there is more identification of "suitable targets," now no longer under a mother's direction but in accordance with peer-group views. That is not to say that early parental influence disappears; under group pressure the postadolescent is likely to rediscover most of the original mother-directed targets which were based on primal sentiments, although these may now be disguised or bear new names.

As his horizons expand beyond his family and neighborhood, the adolescent observes the world at large from a new point of view. The familiar flag, food, language, skin color, etc., continue to provide material outside for externalization, but there now appear more abstract internalizations and con-
ceptualizations infused with affect, such as ethnicity and nationality. The ego identity (Erikson, 1956) has an intimate affective relationship with such suitable abstract targets; the self-concept and concept of the suitable targets are intertwined. Any appreciation in the value of a good target will increase the individual's self-esteem, whereas an attack on his ethnic group will reduce it. Although ego identities differ from individual to individual within the group, its members share the same good and bad targets, and it is these that "glue" them together. Oedipal factors such as devotion to the same leader help accomplish this and are condensed with the pre-oedipal factors.

I hold that the absorption of residual trauma into character, which Blos considers a second precondition of adolescent character formation, is also not completely accomplished. Blos speaks of this lack of completion when *pathology* is present:

> Those adolescents who sidestep the transformation of residual trauma into character formation project the danger situation into the outside world and thus avoid the internal confrontation with it. By having failed to internalize the danger situation, the chance for coming to terms with it is forfeited; projecting it at adolescence onto the outside world results in a state of apprehension over victimization; indecision and bewilderment ensue. (Blos, 1979, p. 184)

What Blos refers to are *projections* of dangerous situations stemming from mental conflicts. But unmended self- and object representations are also externalized at the same time. If a target is utilized both for projections of drive derivatives and defenses against them and for the externalization of unmended self- and object representations, it becomes psychologically indispensable. Through these processes things "out there" are linked to ourselves. Although the state to which Blos refers in the above is exaggeratedly pathological, I think that such projections occur "normally" when they are sanctioned by other group members who also employ the same targets for their own projections. The condensation of externalizations and projections provides a continuum between unmended self- and object representations and pre-oedipal and oedipal dystonic drive expressions.

What is true of Blos's second precondition for character formation can be seen also in his third. Although the adolescent ego tries to establish "historical continuity," such continuity to a "normal" degree is established by projections and externalizations of suitable targets. As the adolescent establishes a sexual identity his shared targets for externalization remain sexually interpenetrated. In other words, the "sexuality" of the targets is seldom the determinant for their becoming reservoirs, since both men and women of a given ethnic or racial group can be made the targets for the receipt of "good" or "bad" unmended self- and object representation from the members of another ethnic or racial group. If you hate the Soviets, for example, it does not matter if the Soviet is a woman or a man. However, this situation may be complicated by projection of high-level wishes, symbols, and other
mental phenomena onto the same targets. In those cases, the sexuality of the target makes it a specific symbol; for instance, the black man may unconsciously represent to a white woman the taboo and dangerous phallus of the oedipal father.

EXPANSION OF THE CONCEPTS OF ETHNICITY AND NATIONALITY

In view of the discussions above, we can expand our understanding of the concepts of ethnicity, nationality, and other group-bonding phenomena. Historians, sociologists, and others report to us that nationalism and ethnicity rise and decline; they offer us historical and sociological reasons for these events. However, from psychoanalytic investigations we have learned that the sharing of primal sentiments is a universal and developmental human phenomenon, and that it often culminates in ethnicity, nationality, and similar phenomena known by other names. It is possible that ethnicity and nationality coalesce more emphatically after the group has been faced with stress or humiliation. Its members may turn to shared targets not only to patch up their disturbed sense of self but also to establish grounds upon which to reunite for mutual support and strength. Under unfavorable circumstances, we also see an increase in the "pathological" use of ethnicity and nationality.

From a phenomenological point of view, then, members of the ethnic group may be seen to share some primal sentiment. Under stress, they "kill" others or "die" themselves in order to solder themselves to such sentiments. The core of what is shared is the same for each member; it is only the periphery which is capable of flexibility. Shared things include all "cultural amplifiers" (Mack, 1984) that are affect-laden. The concept of the land in which dead members of an ethnic group are buried is an especially important link among the group's members. Inanimate objects and symbols are usually idealized. "Devaluation" of idealized symbols is only permissible if the devaluation occurs by consensus of the members of the ethnic group. And when this devaluation occurs it is often an attempt to dismantle sacred objects from within before they are desecrated from without by nonmembers or strangers, so as to "control" the fate of the cultural amplifiers.

From a genetic point of view, then, the bedrock of ethnicity lies beneath a number of higher levels of psychological investment made later. Ethnicity is, at bottom, made up of inanimate or non-human reservoirs that are receptacles for unmended self- and object images—including unmended images of the body—and their accompanying raw emotions. Some of these reservoirs, such as flags, crests, anthems, mascots, remain in inanimate or non-human state throughout the individual's life; others are abstracted into con-
cepts and assimilated back into members' self-representations, or shared concepts, which serve to link the individuals within the group.

It is interesting to note that when the group regresses—often under political stress—there is a reappearance of the ritualistic use of inanimate or non-human objects by members of the group; this serves as a link among them. I have already spoken of the way in which Palestinians in the occupied Gaza Strip carry secret talismans and whistle incantational songs. These shared signifiers help to maintain self-esteem and strengthen mutual support within the group. In 1971 I described the phenomenon of "The Birds of Cyprus." This relates to a period in Cypriot history between 1963 and 1968 when the Greek Cypriots forced the Turks in Cyprus to live in ghettos. During their 5-year imprisonment the Turks, surrounded by their enemies, turned to non-human objects to help bolster their emotional survival in a time of incredible hardship. They raised thousands of parakeets in cages, and cared for them in their homes and shops. The birds became a public emblem for the Turks, who externalized their "imprisoned selves" onto and into the birds. As long as they could nurture the birds, they were able to regulate their individual senses of self, and to maintain the kind of hope that kept their group cohesive.

Thus we see that shared suitable targets of externalization evolve in each group with a certain amount of causality. Although the ethnicity and nationality to which they are related are not biologically inherited, it does seem that the forces in our psychobiological development require us to develop some form of ethnicity and nationality, no matter what we may call these forms; and the nature of suitable targets of externalization reflects our existence as historical creatures. The targets develop under the influence of national leaders, economic factors, long historical processes, military events, forces of nature, and the like. The main contribution psychoanalysis offers to this kind of study depends on its observation that the targets contain elements of self-representations and corresponding object representations and the raw drive derivatives or feeling states attached to them.

From a developmental point of view, the genesis of the impetus to form ethnic groups starts in the pre-oedipal phase; only later do more sophisticated thinking processes, including oedipal issues and symbol formations, become attached to the concept of group. This occurs primarily by means of identification, that unconscious mechanism in which the individual assimilates the images and functions of another within his own self. In the case of an individual's relationship with a group, his self-representation is reshaped through his identification with other members of the group and with the group itself; he acquires attributes he had not previously possessed, and he strengthens those attributes within himself which he perceives to be integral elements in the group's composition. This occurs because he externalizes unmended
self- and object images in the nexus of suitable targets of externalization that comprises the underpinnings of the group. As his ego develops he abstracts the symbolic meanings of these images and reassimilates them in his own self-representation. Moreover, he identifies with the investments others make in such phenomena as religion, ethnicity, and nationalism; where he perceives strong or shifting investments in others, he modifies his own investment in accordance with his identifying ties. He becomes like other members of the group, and embodies what he perceives to be the idealistic aims of that group.

From the point of view of adaptation, the concept and experience of ethnicity is a kind of healing phenomenon, since it provides emotional buffers that protect the bruised self of the individual. The sense of ethnicity patches his sense of self, and links him to his group, which provides him with support and the means of survival.

From the point of view of object relations, we see the potential of using ethnicity in maladaptive ways. In order to protect the inner environment of the group, its members make an attempt to hold onto ego-syntonic suitable targets of externalization and/or their abstracted and reinternalized perceptions and to keep the ego-dystonic ones externalized onto other groups. Those items kept inside are usually libidinally tinged — but this is not always true. An ethnic group may like to hold onto aggressively tinged symbols in order to shore up an aggressively tinged sense of character that will bind it from within. In these cases the enemy group may then be considered soft or cowardly.

THE ENEMY IS LIKE US

Ethnicity, nationality, and similar abstractions are creations of our own psyche and thus it is reasonable to regard the psyche as the creator of the concept of the enemy. We cannot reasonably assert that the enemy may not be in fact a dangerous force, but it is still true that the “enemy” is a creation of that developmental process in which perception is complicated by higher-level thought, internalization, and oedipal issues. As long as the enemy group is kept at least at a psychological distance, it gives us aid and comfort, enhancing our cohesion and making comparisons with ourselves gratifying.

Furthermore, it is interesting to contemplate the subtle fact that the enemy often resembles us in obvious ways, while what we perceive to be his offense constitutes only a narrow area of disagreement. Freud (1917) spoke of “the narcissism of minor differences” in reference to the way small differences among people otherwise alike make for hostility and alienation. In 1930 he applied this concept to international affairs. He was curious as to why people living in contiguous lands so often came into conflict — why the Por-
tugese and the Spanish were at odds, or the English and the Scots, or the Northern and Southern Germans, when each pair of opponents had so much in common. It seems that we often seek out as enemies (targets) those like ourselves or our neighbors—in other words, familiar people. When an “unfamiliar” group becomes our enemy, we become preoccupied with it. In a sense, we “familiarize” ourselves with it according to the dictates of our psychic force. Hate and aggression make for attachment to the other as much as does love and, sometimes, even more. We use them for the externalization of our bad self- and object images; these we may superimpose upon (or condense with) the projections of our unacceptable thoughts. We focus, obsessively, when stressed, on our differences in order to cling to the illusion that the enemy is quite unlike us. For example, men in the villages of Cyprus used to dress alike save that Turks wore red sashes and Greeks, black ones. In time of ethnic hostility, each would rather die than adopt the color of the other. This process strengthens our sense of self and our sense of solidarity with “our side.” After all, the main point of drawing lines between “them” and “us,” however specious the justification for those lines may be, is to clarify and affirm the sense of “us” in a way that strengthens positive self-representation. The self-portrait of any group is relative, depending in varying degrees on the kind of dark background that will bring its own light and strong qualities into relief.

CONCLUSION

I believe that the need to have enemies and allies is the basis of political psychology and that it connects politics, not only to the psychology apparent in surface behavior and evident processes, but also with depth psychology which deals with the dynamics of human development.

This is not to say that the complex of politics is to be regarded as an objective correlative of the development of the individual human psyche; both psychology and the study of politics would suffer oversimplification in such reductionism. But rather, we may profit from a premise that identifies a group as being composed of individuals who, as humans, have shared fundamental developmental processes. Moreover, we risk a great deal if we overlook the confluence of individual and group development, and of intra- and intergroup development. Psychoanalysis gives us a key for appraising one ubiquitous and fairly constant element in the tangle of historical, economic, and cultural aspects of what we call politics. Political psychology, which illuminates and anticipates consistency in the behavior of political groups, must also attempt to locate the seat of that behavior by using the knowledge of human development we have acquired. The marriage of depth
psychology and behavioral science in political psychology secures its position as an essential element in the study of international or interethnic conflict.

George Orwell concluded that "the nationalistic loves and hatreds...are a part of the make-up of most of us, whether we like it or not" (p. 380).

Our task then is to wean such sentiments from their maladaptive roles, and to find adaptive ways to use them. Although I am not enumerating here the many areas in which these methods can be used, I do hope to suggest that it is within our realm of responsibility to develop an approach to conflict that comprehends the psychology of politics. For example, we should continue to develop rituals of play among a variety of nations (in the real spirit of the Olympic Games) so that covert antagonisms may be dispersed, or at least temporized, in a constructive and affirmative forum. Furthermore, we must broaden our focus upon international conflict to include empathy for the pain and loss of all parties involved, and recognize that those losses may exist on many unseen levels. And our broadened focus must be actively reflected in the development of new compassionate and insightful methods of dealing with interpolitical strife.

Orwell saw the struggle against "nationalistic loves and hatred" as essentially involving "moral effort."

It is a question first of all discovering what one really is, what one's own feelings really are, and then of making allowances for the inevitable bias. If you hate and fear Russia, if you are jealous of the wealth and power of America, if you despise Jews, if you have a sentiment of inferiority towards the British ruling class, you cannot get rid of those feelings simply by taking thought. But you can at least recognise that you have them, and prevent them from contaminating your mental processes. The emotional urges which are inescapable, and are perhaps even necessary to political action, should be able to exist side by side with an acceptance of reality. But this, I repeat, needs a moral effort, and contemporary English literature, so far as it is alive at all to the major issues of our time, shows how few of us are prepared to make it. (p. 380)

Orwell's insight is especially valuable in 1984. Now, more than ever, we appreciate his prescience.

REFERENCES


